Back last spring the administration agreed to accept establishing some "benchmarks" in return for receiving a no-strings-attached military spending addendum. These benchmarks were set to help determine what progress, if any, was being made as a result of the new surge of American troops sent to Iraq. They were set by the administration, in consultation with the Iraqi government and the US military.
In other words, these are the 18 guidelines which the administration itself said progress in Iraq , or lack thereof, should be measured by.
1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.
2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform.
3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.
5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq.
8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
11. Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.
12. Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President Bush as saying, “the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.
13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.
14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.
16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.
18. Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF.
The administrations own analysis, by people with self-interest in presenting the most optimistic and positive view possible, found that only half of these guidelines had been met.
The non-partisan GAO, which has no stake in making things look optimistic or positive, found only three of the 18 benchmarks had been met (8, 14, 16), another four partially met (4, 9, 12, 17).
One can debate how difficult meeting these guidelines might be - heck, considering how wonderfully well all the training of Iraqis was going way back in 2004 according to Gen. Petreaus (who, after all, was in charge of said training at that time), meeting 9 and 15 should have been "gimme's" - but no one forced these on the administration. These were goals it set, and said "judge by these standards".
Well, the administration and the surge have been judged ... and they have been found wanting.
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