The NY Times has an article today discussing the decreasing number of attacks in Iraq, which have reportedly fallen to levels not seen since Feb. 2006. The number of Iraqi deaths in October is expected to be the lowest monthly total since then as well. Meanwhile, US troops deaths in Iraq, which had been at record or near-record highs through the end of August, dropped to 38 last month, the lowest figure since Mar. 2006.
In discussing the various factors involved, the 11th paragraph begins: "Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, has ordered his militiamen to stand down."
If one only read this article, one might think this was a recent development. As in, "things are going sooooooo well, even al-Sadr thought it was safe enough to stand down his militia."
One would be wrong. In fact, al-Sadr called for the militia stand down at the end of August.
Let's connect some dots. The surge began in January of this year. Throughout the year, as US troops levels increased there was no indication they were having any clear effect in decreasing violence. Each month, US casualties were higher than the corresponding month in 2006 (which was already a high-casualty year). As late as August, Iraqi civilian casualties were high, but September saw a significant drop, which apparently continued last month.
Through the summer there were comments about the lethality of explosively formed penetrators, supposedly provided by Iran ... which most certainly was not providing them to primarily Sunni groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, but rather to Shi'ite organizations, such as, just to pick a random example, al-Sadr's militia brigades.
So which is the bigger factor, the surge or al-Sadr's proclamation? There will, of course, be a spate of articles, talking heads comments, blog posts, etc., which claim the former, but the numbers don't bear that out. The surge occurred over a period of months during which violence and casualties were extremely high. Al-Sadr opens his mouth, and immediately violence and casualties drop spectacularly.
Sometimes the timely words of a self-interested lunatic mean more than a few 10's of thousands of American soldiers. Unfortunately, he could open his mouth again and reverse the trend nearly as quickly.
Showing posts with label surge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label surge. Show all posts
Monday, November 19, 2007
Monday, October 15, 2007
Are we done yet?
The Washington Post has a story today about a debate within the army and the administration over declaring "victory" against al-Qaeda in Iraq. The consensus seems to be AQI has taken some heavy hits in recent months, severely damaging its capacity for terror operations, and some folks want a public declaration to the effect, while others, having seen similar "Mission Accomplished" and "Last Throes" statements turn out poorly in the past, are taking a more cautious view.
Of course, there is another reason to not declare victory as well, which the article mentions but I am going to discuss here anyway ...
It's unquestionably a good thing that AQI has been significantly reduced in effectiveness by our recent operations there. Hopefully the pressure on the organization really has cracked it, to the point of being irrecoverable. If so, however, it raises two points in my mind:
1. What, exactly, does it say about our occupation that "declaring victory" over a terrorist organization in Iraq which never existed prior to our occupation is seen as a sign of progress and optimism? I mean, AQI only ever came about in the first place because we decided to invade Iraq. No invasion, no terrorists.
It's like saying "this was an offshoot of our bad planning and poor decision-making, but we've mostly fixed the direct problem (although it's true a multitude of other, related problems still exist), so lets declare victory. Huzzah!"
2. As the article notes, one reason given for not declaring victory is if there are no terrorists left it opens up the question of why we still need troops there. I.e., if it's not the terrorists doing all the shooting and killing and bombing, aren't our troops just trying to referee a civil war?
Of course, it has been true for a considerable time the vast majority of violence perpetrated in Iraq has had nothing whatsoever to do with AQI or any other recognized terrorist organization, and has had everything to do with factional conflicts within Iraq. This can't be admitted, however, or what little public support still remains for keeping our troops over there would collapse even further.
It's all a pipe-dream. The chances our troops are going to exit Iraq within the next two years is roughly the same as our cars being pooped on by dive-bombing pigs. Endless rationalizations for the war follow the same life-cycle: creation, promotion, prove to be false, discard in favor of yet another rationalization ... and the cycle of death continues unabated.
Of course, there is another reason to not declare victory as well, which the article mentions but I am going to discuss here anyway ...
It's unquestionably a good thing that AQI has been significantly reduced in effectiveness by our recent operations there. Hopefully the pressure on the organization really has cracked it, to the point of being irrecoverable. If so, however, it raises two points in my mind:
1. What, exactly, does it say about our occupation that "declaring victory" over a terrorist organization in Iraq which never existed prior to our occupation is seen as a sign of progress and optimism? I mean, AQI only ever came about in the first place because we decided to invade Iraq. No invasion, no terrorists.
It's like saying "this was an offshoot of our bad planning and poor decision-making, but we've mostly fixed the direct problem (although it's true a multitude of other, related problems still exist), so lets declare victory. Huzzah!"
2. As the article notes, one reason given for not declaring victory is if there are no terrorists left it opens up the question of why we still need troops there. I.e., if it's not the terrorists doing all the shooting and killing and bombing, aren't our troops just trying to referee a civil war?
Of course, it has been true for a considerable time the vast majority of violence perpetrated in Iraq has had nothing whatsoever to do with AQI or any other recognized terrorist organization, and has had everything to do with factional conflicts within Iraq. This can't be admitted, however, or what little public support still remains for keeping our troops over there would collapse even further.
It's all a pipe-dream. The chances our troops are going to exit Iraq within the next two years is roughly the same as our cars being pooped on by dive-bombing pigs. Endless rationalizations for the war follow the same life-cycle: creation, promotion, prove to be false, discard in favor of yet another rationalization ... and the cycle of death continues unabated.
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
Some interrelated data
The NYTimes has an article today describing what it has found concerning the now infamous Blackwater incident last week in Baghdad. The article goes out of its way to point out not all information is known, but the information which is known, largely from eyewitnesses, paints a pretty damning picture.
This is the latest of a number of incidents involving Blackwater, and has sparked a number of investigations, both in Iraq and the United States. One big issue has been the sheer number of mercenaries our government employs in Iraq. An idea can be gained by looking at how rapidly Blackwater's government contracts have escalated: from roughly $750K in 2001 to over $600 million last year.
That's a lot of soldiers, outside any formal chain of command, costing up to six times what a member of the US military does ... and at the same time lets the government get away with claiming we "only" have around 150K troops in Iraq, instead of the 300K plus actually there.
Meanwhile, as Liza points out in a comment here, things are looking up in Basra:
This ties in nicely with Iraqi opinions about the surge and the US presence in Iraq. As this BBC article notes, 70% of Iraqis polled last month think the surge has failed, roughly 60% think attacks on US forces are justified, and a plurality, 47%, want US forces to leave Iraq immediately (Lets not even mention the majority of Americans who want the same thing).
Of course, all those defeatists hadn't seen last months casualty numbers when the poll was ocnducted - I am sure their views are very different now, and most of them are singing Hosannahs for the US troops, and writing poetic odes lauding the occupation.
Meanwhile, our elected leaders are condemning newspaper ads and arguing over whether Rush Limbaugh should be scorned or hailed for his remarks concerning "phony" soldiers. Hopefully House Appropriations Committee chair Dave Obey will stick to his guns ... maybe something will actually get done.
This is the latest of a number of incidents involving Blackwater, and has sparked a number of investigations, both in Iraq and the United States. One big issue has been the sheer number of mercenaries our government employs in Iraq. An idea can be gained by looking at how rapidly Blackwater's government contracts have escalated: from roughly $750K in 2001 to over $600 million last year.
That's a lot of soldiers, outside any formal chain of command, costing up to six times what a member of the US military does ... and at the same time lets the government get away with claiming we "only" have around 150K troops in Iraq, instead of the 300K plus actually there.
Meanwhile, as Liza points out in a comment here, things are looking up in Basra:
"BASRA, Iraq (Reuters) - Residents of Iraq's southern city of Basra have begun strolling riverfront streets again after four years of fear, their city much quieter since British troops withdrew from the grand Saddam Hussein-era Basra Palace.
Political assassinations and sectarian violence continue, some city officials say, but on a much smaller scale than at any time since British troops moved into the city after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.
...
"The situation these days is better. We were living in hell ... the area is calm since their withdrawal," said housewife Khairiya Salman, who lives near the palace."
This ties in nicely with Iraqi opinions about the surge and the US presence in Iraq. As this BBC article notes, 70% of Iraqis polled last month think the surge has failed, roughly 60% think attacks on US forces are justified, and a plurality, 47%, want US forces to leave Iraq immediately (Lets not even mention the majority of Americans who want the same thing).
Of course, all those defeatists hadn't seen last months casualty numbers when the poll was ocnducted - I am sure their views are very different now, and most of them are singing Hosannahs for the US troops, and writing poetic odes lauding the occupation.
Meanwhile, our elected leaders are condemning newspaper ads and arguing over whether Rush Limbaugh should be scorned or hailed for his remarks concerning "phony" soldiers. Hopefully House Appropriations Committee chair Dave Obey will stick to his guns ... maybe something will actually get done.
Monday, October 1, 2007
A good month in Iraq
I've spent much of the summer making posts, both on this blog and in comments at other forums, about the ineffectiveness of the "surge" in limiting casualties both among American troops and Iraqis. Therefore, it is only fair I point out this past month bucks the trend.
There were only 64 US soldiers killed in September, the lowest monthly figure in 14 months, and the first time this year a given month had fewer US soldier fatalities than the same month the prior year (by comparison, 72 US soldiers were killed in Sept. 2006).
Meanwhile, the initial figures for Iraqi civilian deaths in September is 922, a more than 50% decline from August, and the lowest figure in 15 months.
Before the "see, the surge is working!" brigades get going full force, however, there are several things I would like to point out:
* In Sept. 2005 there was a relatively low number of US fatalities (49 in Sept. 2005, compared to 85 in Aug. 2005). There were some comments then about "turning the corner". We all know how that turned out.
* Regardless of how many or how few casualties there may have been, it remains true on the political front there has been no further progress. Without political resolution, events in Iraq can not be termed a success.
Given we've had single-month periods like this before, I'll give it some more time before declaring a trend is in progress. Call me back in two months if casualty counts continue to decline. If they do, though, that much-vaunted "breathing-space" the surge is supposed to be creating may actually come into existence.
There were only 64 US soldiers killed in September, the lowest monthly figure in 14 months, and the first time this year a given month had fewer US soldier fatalities than the same month the prior year (by comparison, 72 US soldiers were killed in Sept. 2006).
Meanwhile, the initial figures for Iraqi civilian deaths in September is 922, a more than 50% decline from August, and the lowest figure in 15 months.
Before the "see, the surge is working!" brigades get going full force, however, there are several things I would like to point out:
* In Sept. 2005 there was a relatively low number of US fatalities (49 in Sept. 2005, compared to 85 in Aug. 2005). There were some comments then about "turning the corner". We all know how that turned out.
* Regardless of how many or how few casualties there may have been, it remains true on the political front there has been no further progress. Without political resolution, events in Iraq can not be termed a success.
Given we've had single-month periods like this before, I'll give it some more time before declaring a trend is in progress. Call me back in two months if casualty counts continue to decline. If they do, though, that much-vaunted "breathing-space" the surge is supposed to be creating may actually come into existence.
Monday, September 17, 2007
Surging downward
Alan Greenspan has a new book out today, and as is often the case with new books small excerpts are leaking out as agents and publishers attempt to build up demand for copies. However, even by such standards the one-liner making the round over the weekend seemed explosive:
"I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil."
Coming from a source such as Greenspan, this remark could be taken as particularly telling about the administration's real reasons for invading Iraq. Usually the people making such comments are left-wing, anti-war, anti-administration bloggers such as ... well ... myself. Or Liza.
Suffice to say, Greenspan doesn't fit the template.
Having thought about this some, however, and recognizing I have not read the book yet, I find it unlikely Greenspan is claiming the primary reason we invaded Iraq was oil, but rather that the reason we care about the region at oil is the oil reserves there, and Saddam was seen as a destabilizing force in an area we cared about. It's a small, but important distinction - had Saddam existed in, say, central Africa, he may still have been a destabilizing force but we likely wouldn't have invaded his nation, simply because there is nothing there we care about as much as we care about middle-Eastern oil.
Update: Greenspan seems to support this take in a Wall Street Journal interview available here.
Regardless of our rationale for the initial invasion, however, the supposed rationale behind the escalation this year took another body blow over the weekend when the faction of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr announced Saturday it would withdraw its support for Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Considering the Sadr faction had a significant hand in al-Maliki's being able to establish a parliamentary majority in the first place, this is another real body blow to the ability of the Iraqi government to continue to rule at all, much less effectively, at least as it is currently constituted.
The underlying purposes for sending more troops to Iraq was supposed to be to provide the government there "breathing space" to make some hard, but necessary, decisions regarding the future of the country. Instead, the government continues to spiral into chaos. I'm sure the administration will see that simply as further justification to keep troops there - if things are going well we need to keep troops there because things are going well, if things are going poorly we need to keep troops there because things are going poorly. Staying in Iraq is a tautology.
Meanwhile, there is an interesting new research paper (hat tip to Freakonomics) analyzing the data from the Iraq surge from an economist's stand point. The entire paper is worth a read, and the author concludes the signs are mixed, with casualty data (both civilian and military) pointing to the surge making some progress, but other data pointing toward a deteriorating situation.
However, the most interesting point, and most telling, is the author's analysis of the Iraqi bond markets - he determines that since the surge began, confidence in the ability of the Iraqi government to repay bonds it sells has fallen by 40%. Given the generally well-established track record of financial markets in predicting the future, this is pretty damning.
Combine it with the news last week that Hunt Oil Co., who's CEO Ray Hunt is on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has struck a deal with the Kurdistan National Assembly to explore and drill in the Kurdish region, without the Iraqi government being included in the negotiations or contract, and it becomes increasingly clear which way the smart money is betting - against the administration.
Given the respective track records, that certainly seems the way to go.
"I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil."
Coming from a source such as Greenspan, this remark could be taken as particularly telling about the administration's real reasons for invading Iraq. Usually the people making such comments are left-wing, anti-war, anti-administration bloggers such as ... well ... myself. Or Liza.
Suffice to say, Greenspan doesn't fit the template.
Having thought about this some, however, and recognizing I have not read the book yet, I find it unlikely Greenspan is claiming the primary reason we invaded Iraq was oil, but rather that the reason we care about the region at oil is the oil reserves there, and Saddam was seen as a destabilizing force in an area we cared about. It's a small, but important distinction - had Saddam existed in, say, central Africa, he may still have been a destabilizing force but we likely wouldn't have invaded his nation, simply because there is nothing there we care about as much as we care about middle-Eastern oil.
Update: Greenspan seems to support this take in a Wall Street Journal interview available here.
Regardless of our rationale for the initial invasion, however, the supposed rationale behind the escalation this year took another body blow over the weekend when the faction of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr announced Saturday it would withdraw its support for Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Considering the Sadr faction had a significant hand in al-Maliki's being able to establish a parliamentary majority in the first place, this is another real body blow to the ability of the Iraqi government to continue to rule at all, much less effectively, at least as it is currently constituted.
The underlying purposes for sending more troops to Iraq was supposed to be to provide the government there "breathing space" to make some hard, but necessary, decisions regarding the future of the country. Instead, the government continues to spiral into chaos. I'm sure the administration will see that simply as further justification to keep troops there - if things are going well we need to keep troops there because things are going well, if things are going poorly we need to keep troops there because things are going poorly. Staying in Iraq is a tautology.
Meanwhile, there is an interesting new research paper (hat tip to Freakonomics) analyzing the data from the Iraq surge from an economist's stand point. The entire paper is worth a read, and the author concludes the signs are mixed, with casualty data (both civilian and military) pointing to the surge making some progress, but other data pointing toward a deteriorating situation.
However, the most interesting point, and most telling, is the author's analysis of the Iraqi bond markets - he determines that since the surge began, confidence in the ability of the Iraqi government to repay bonds it sells has fallen by 40%. Given the generally well-established track record of financial markets in predicting the future, this is pretty damning.
Combine it with the news last week that Hunt Oil Co., who's CEO Ray Hunt is on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has struck a deal with the Kurdistan National Assembly to explore and drill in the Kurdish region, without the Iraqi government being included in the negotiations or contract, and it becomes increasingly clear which way the smart money is betting - against the administration.
Given the respective track records, that certainly seems the way to go.
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Sucky math skills
Way back in the dawn of time, last May, the President signed a military spending supplemental bill while at the same time proclaiming a list of 18 bench marks it was hoped the surge (supported by the new funding appropriations) would help the military and Iraqi government meet.
In July the administration provided an update on progress toward meeting those benchmarks, but even that most optimistically spun view found "satisfactory" progress had been achieved on only 8 of the 18. For the record, thats 44.4 percent.
The Washington Post got its hands on a copy of the soon-to-be-released GAO report, and it paints a completely starker picture, including:
* Finding the number of Iraqi units capable of independent operation declined from ten in March to six in July, contradicting the administration's findings.
* Finding the number of attacks on Iraqi civilians has remained effectively unchanged, going from 25 per day in February to 26 per day last month, directly contradicting the administration's claims.
In total, the GAO determined satisfactory progress has occurred on two of ten security benchmarks, and one of eight political ones. That's 20% and 12.5% respectively. Overall, it's a 16.67% success rate.
Meanwhile, our President is putting out word he will ask for as much as $50 billion more next month to further support the surge. That's in addition to the $147 billion request already on the table. Doing the math once again, we get $197 billion, a fair chunk of change.
Apparently our President thinks progress in Iraq has been soooooooo outstanding, that not only should we not re-evaluate as to whether we should be there at all, we should instead be pumping even more money, and more blood, into the struggle.
Frankly, I don't understand how a Yale degree can be as prestigious as it is when 16.67% isn't just considered a passing score, but is considered such a magnificent grade it's worth substantial reward ... like, say, an additional $50 billion attached to a no-restrictions spending bill.
Or perhaps our President simply needs to take one of x4mr's math courses.
In July the administration provided an update on progress toward meeting those benchmarks, but even that most optimistically spun view found "satisfactory" progress had been achieved on only 8 of the 18. For the record, thats 44.4 percent.
The Washington Post got its hands on a copy of the soon-to-be-released GAO report, and it paints a completely starker picture, including:
* Finding the number of Iraqi units capable of independent operation declined from ten in March to six in July, contradicting the administration's findings.
* Finding the number of attacks on Iraqi civilians has remained effectively unchanged, going from 25 per day in February to 26 per day last month, directly contradicting the administration's claims.
In total, the GAO determined satisfactory progress has occurred on two of ten security benchmarks, and one of eight political ones. That's 20% and 12.5% respectively. Overall, it's a 16.67% success rate.
Meanwhile, our President is putting out word he will ask for as much as $50 billion more next month to further support the surge. That's in addition to the $147 billion request already on the table. Doing the math once again, we get $197 billion, a fair chunk of change.
Apparently our President thinks progress in Iraq has been soooooooo outstanding, that not only should we not re-evaluate as to whether we should be there at all, we should instead be pumping even more money, and more blood, into the struggle.
Frankly, I don't understand how a Yale degree can be as prestigious as it is when 16.67% isn't just considered a passing score, but is considered such a magnificent grade it's worth substantial reward ... like, say, an additional $50 billion attached to a no-restrictions spending bill.
Or perhaps our President simply needs to take one of x4mr's math courses.
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
September Storm
Last fall saw what was widely perceived as a pivotal election. Democrats took control of the House (which was expected, although the margin was larger than anticipated) and the Senate (which was a large surprise ... some pickups were expected, but not six). The unquestioned impetus for this revocation of Republicans was Iraq occupation, and the demands of the electorate that "something" be done about it.
What started off as a Congress filled with hope saw some early successes such as an increase in the minimum wage. However, the elephant in the room wasn't addressed until April, and ultimately the hopes of the majority of voters were denied when Congress passed a no-strings war funding bill to last through the summer. Not surprisingly, rather than being hailed as "bi-partisan", the story was instead how Democrats had backed-down in the face of demands from one of the least popular Presidents in our history.
Still, there remained some small beacon of light - at the end of the summer the spending bill wold lapse, and Congress would review the situation to see if the President's escalation merited further investment, both in lives and money, in what seemed increasingly like a quagmire.
Skip ahead to mid-August. Despite a series of claims of an improving military situation - including, but not limited to, the now (in)famous O'Hanlon/Pollack op-ed piece in the NY Times, or the relentlessly warmongering Joe Lieberman (who recently pushed for action against Syria) - it's questionable as to whether the situation is really improving at all. As I have noted before, the military says attacks and civilian casualties are on the decline, but provides no actual numbers to support it. Independently compiled statistics seem to indicate civilian casualties are stable, but attacks have actually increased by 5%, which would directly contradict the claims of improvement.
Perhaps most importantly, US troop losses aren't showing any notable decline, and the loss of 14 more yesterday doesn't help in that regard.
Despite how they like to present their visits on talk shows and in op-eds, when O'Hanlon, Pollack, Lieberman, et. al. visit Iraq, they don't really visit Iraq. What they do is spend time in the Green Zone, maybe head out to a few cities where they visit with military officials, and maybe some carefully vetted Iranian representatives, and are essentially reliant for their "impressions" and "opinions" solely on information from these sources, information which they really can't verify.
Never mind that the opinion of those who actually are out risking their lives every day, those who really can attest to what the daily situation is like on the streets of Iraq, is nearly 180 degrees away from what these hit-and-run visitors present.
The latest to participate in one of these dog-and-pony shows is Democratic Senator Carl Levin, who returned from an extensive two-day survey the situation to announce:
That would be the same Iraqi army who, along with Iraqi police, are helping insurgents place bombs along roadsides to kill Americans. Yes, that's progress.
Levin goes on to mention that while the military aspects may be improving, he sees little (if any) hope in the political realm. Of course, that caveat fails to get any mention ... all the headlines are along the lines of: "Surge working, Levin says".
It doesn't take the Oracle of Delphi to see where this is headed. Even though the entire point of the surge was to allow the Iraqi government to make some hard political decisions, which it has utterly failed to do, it won't take many Democratic defections to pass another military bill free of constraints such as time lines for withdrawal, despite that being the key underlying reason many of the freshman Democrats were elected in the first place.
These days you see a lot of posts at conservative sites (why, here's one now!) discussing how Congress "is even more unpopular than Bush". Which is true. It's the reasons for that unpopularity which they don't discuss, but which are most interesting.
A CBS poll from earlier this month spells it out nicely (via Greenwald):
The approval ratings among Republicans is actually somewhat high when compared to the percentage of Democrats who approved the last Republican Congress. Independents are lower, but not by a huge margin. What really stands out is the low percentage of Democrats who approve of the job Congress is doing. If that number were up in, say, the mid-60's, which is pretty typical for members of the party which controls Congress, the overall approval rating would be pretty standard.
Those disaffected Democrats (and one suspects a large number of the disaffected Independents) aren't upset because Congress "isn't supporting the troops", or is "micromanaging the war" or any other Limbaugh-led talking point. They're pissed off (and increasingly more so) because this Congress was elected large to create opposition to the administrations policies - to actually do something about warrentless wiretapping, about habeas corpus, about, most importantly, getting our young men and women out of Iraq.
All of which this Congress has steadfastly refused to do.
If Levin et. al. manage to talk themselves into caving to the President again next month, allowing yet another unfettered prolonging of the war ... well, if you want to see Congress play limbo with its approval ratings, there may never be a better opportunity
What started off as a Congress filled with hope saw some early successes such as an increase in the minimum wage. However, the elephant in the room wasn't addressed until April, and ultimately the hopes of the majority of voters were denied when Congress passed a no-strings war funding bill to last through the summer. Not surprisingly, rather than being hailed as "bi-partisan", the story was instead how Democrats had backed-down in the face of demands from one of the least popular Presidents in our history.
Still, there remained some small beacon of light - at the end of the summer the spending bill wold lapse, and Congress would review the situation to see if the President's escalation merited further investment, both in lives and money, in what seemed increasingly like a quagmire.
Skip ahead to mid-August. Despite a series of claims of an improving military situation - including, but not limited to, the now (in)famous O'Hanlon/Pollack op-ed piece in the NY Times, or the relentlessly warmongering Joe Lieberman (who recently pushed for action against Syria) - it's questionable as to whether the situation is really improving at all. As I have noted before, the military says attacks and civilian casualties are on the decline, but provides no actual numbers to support it. Independently compiled statistics seem to indicate civilian casualties are stable, but attacks have actually increased by 5%, which would directly contradict the claims of improvement.
Perhaps most importantly, US troop losses aren't showing any notable decline, and the loss of 14 more yesterday doesn't help in that regard.
Despite how they like to present their visits on talk shows and in op-eds, when O'Hanlon, Pollack, Lieberman, et. al. visit Iraq, they don't really visit Iraq. What they do is spend time in the Green Zone, maybe head out to a few cities where they visit with military officials, and maybe some carefully vetted Iranian representatives, and are essentially reliant for their "impressions" and "opinions" solely on information from these sources, information which they really can't verify.
Never mind that the opinion of those who actually are out risking their lives every day, those who really can attest to what the daily situation is like on the streets of Iraq, is nearly 180 degrees away from what these hit-and-run visitors present.
The latest to participate in one of these dog-and-pony shows is Democratic Senator Carl Levin, who returned from an extensive two-day survey the situation to announce:
"We visited forward operating bases in Mosul and Baghdad. In these areas, as well as a number of others in Iraq, the military aspects of President Bush’s new strategy in Iraq, as articulated by him on January 10, 2007, appear to have produced some credible and positive results. "
...
"We note the continuing improvement in the ability and willingness of the Iraqi Army to conduct combat operations against the insurgents ..."
That would be the same Iraqi army who, along with Iraqi police, are helping insurgents place bombs along roadsides to kill Americans. Yes, that's progress.
Levin goes on to mention that while the military aspects may be improving, he sees little (if any) hope in the political realm. Of course, that caveat fails to get any mention ... all the headlines are along the lines of: "Surge working, Levin says".
It doesn't take the Oracle of Delphi to see where this is headed. Even though the entire point of the surge was to allow the Iraqi government to make some hard political decisions, which it has utterly failed to do, it won't take many Democratic defections to pass another military bill free of constraints such as time lines for withdrawal, despite that being the key underlying reason many of the freshman Democrats were elected in the first place.
These days you see a lot of posts at conservative sites (why, here's one now!) discussing how Congress "is even more unpopular than Bush". Which is true. It's the reasons for that unpopularity which they don't discuss, but which are most interesting.
A CBS poll from earlier this month spells it out nicely (via Greenwald):
"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?" | ||||||
. | ||||||
Approve | Disapprove | Unsure | ||||
% | % | % | ||||
| ALL adults | 25 | 63 | 12 | |||
| Republicans | 24 | 66 | 10 | |||
| Democrats | 28 | 59 | 13 | |||
| Independents | 23 | 66 | 11 | |||
The approval ratings among Republicans is actually somewhat high when compared to the percentage of Democrats who approved the last Republican Congress. Independents are lower, but not by a huge margin. What really stands out is the low percentage of Democrats who approve of the job Congress is doing. If that number were up in, say, the mid-60's, which is pretty typical for members of the party which controls Congress, the overall approval rating would be pretty standard.
Those disaffected Democrats (and one suspects a large number of the disaffected Independents) aren't upset because Congress "isn't supporting the troops", or is "micromanaging the war" or any other Limbaugh-led talking point. They're pissed off (and increasingly more so) because this Congress was elected large to create opposition to the administrations policies - to actually do something about warrentless wiretapping, about habeas corpus, about, most importantly, getting our young men and women out of Iraq.
All of which this Congress has steadfastly refused to do.
If Levin et. al. manage to talk themselves into caving to the President again next month, allowing yet another unfettered prolonging of the war ... well, if you want to see Congress play limbo with its approval ratings, there may never be a better opportunity
Tuesday, August 7, 2007
Success? This is Success?
Last month, "only" 80 US soldiers were killed in Iraq, down from 101 in June and a high of 126 in May. The administration and various war-supporters are already touting this as near irrefutable proof the surge is working, and if we just wait yet another six more months the true genius of Our Glorious Leader (and Dubya too!) will finally be revealed for all to see, even liberals.
Being the spoil-sport I am, however, I wanted to look at a few more of the numbers, which are available here. In looking at them, two things stand out:
1. The 80 deaths last month are essentially identical to the 83, 81 and 81 in January, February and March of this year respectively. That's when the surge was initiated. Put another way, there has been effectively no drop in US casualties per month since the start of the surge.
2. For whatever reason, possibly the onset of the stifling summer heat, both 2005 and 2006 saw low casualty figures for US troops in July when compared to adjacent months.
June 2005: 78
July 2005: 54
August 2005: 85
June 2006: 61
July 2006: 43
August 2006: 65
With 20 casualties so far in August, we are on pace for 88 or 89 more dead soldiers this month. I am sure the same set of people will find some way to explain to the heathen unbelievers such as myself why an uptick in the death count (if the pace continues) would also be evidence the surge is working.
The surge can't fail, only the rationale can fail. If the rationale fails, simply change the rationale. Long live the surge! ¡Desea vivo la oleada! Long live the Emperor! Er ... uhm ... we mean the Vice President of course.
Even if one looks at the numbers, though, and somehow manages to talk himself into believing the surge is succeeding militarily, what Lord Cheney, Prime Minion Bush and others induced to spread the gospel of Success In Iraq hope your forget - really, they need you to forget - is that the military aspect was always the least important part of the surge.
The whole point of placing additional troops in Iraq was to help create "breathing space" for the Iraqi government, which in turn was supposed to achieve certain political "benchmarks". The military aspects have always been secondary to the political ones.
Needless to say, however mediocre (at best) progress might be on the military front, it gets an A+ grade compared to the political situation.
Despite no progress whatsoever on meeting the desired benchmarks, the entire Iraqi parliament has opted to take a month break. In the interim, the largest Sunni block resigned at the start of the month, five more cabinet members announced yesterday they would boycott government meetings (an action one described as "first step toward withdrawal" from the government), and six ministers from Moqtada al-Sadr's faction, who walked out in April, show no sign of coming back.
Meanwhile, as the British prepare to pull out of Basra, Shiites there are pushing for more independence.
As we approach the mid-September date for the much-awaited report on the effects of the surge the Iraqi government, on whose behalf the surge was allegedly initiated in the first place, the government which is supposed to be making progress toward a new Constitution, agreeable power-sharing and financial arrangements, the government we have sent 30,000 more young Americans over to fight and possibly die for ... that government is on the verge of collapse.
Apparently I am overdue for my administration-sponsored brainwashing. No matter how hard I squint, no matter how rosy I tint my glasses, no matter how often I chant happy mantras to myself ("Mission accomplished!" "Greeted with flowers!"), no matter how much effort I expend in positive thinking ... I just can't make this look like progress.
Being the spoil-sport I am, however, I wanted to look at a few more of the numbers, which are available here. In looking at them, two things stand out:
1. The 80 deaths last month are essentially identical to the 83, 81 and 81 in January, February and March of this year respectively. That's when the surge was initiated. Put another way, there has been effectively no drop in US casualties per month since the start of the surge.
2. For whatever reason, possibly the onset of the stifling summer heat, both 2005 and 2006 saw low casualty figures for US troops in July when compared to adjacent months.
June 2005: 78
July 2005: 54
August 2005: 85
June 2006: 61
July 2006: 43
August 2006: 65
With 20 casualties so far in August, we are on pace for 88 or 89 more dead soldiers this month. I am sure the same set of people will find some way to explain to the heathen unbelievers such as myself why an uptick in the death count (if the pace continues) would also be evidence the surge is working.
The surge can't fail, only the rationale can fail. If the rationale fails, simply change the rationale. Long live the surge! ¡Desea vivo la oleada! Long live the Emperor! Er ... uhm ... we mean the Vice President of course.
Even if one looks at the numbers, though, and somehow manages to talk himself into believing the surge is succeeding militarily, what Lord Cheney, Prime Minion Bush and others induced to spread the gospel of Success In Iraq hope your forget - really, they need you to forget - is that the military aspect was always the least important part of the surge.
The whole point of placing additional troops in Iraq was to help create "breathing space" for the Iraqi government, which in turn was supposed to achieve certain political "benchmarks". The military aspects have always been secondary to the political ones.
Needless to say, however mediocre (at best) progress might be on the military front, it gets an A+ grade compared to the political situation.
Despite no progress whatsoever on meeting the desired benchmarks, the entire Iraqi parliament has opted to take a month break. In the interim, the largest Sunni block resigned at the start of the month, five more cabinet members announced yesterday they would boycott government meetings (an action one described as "first step toward withdrawal" from the government), and six ministers from Moqtada al-Sadr's faction, who walked out in April, show no sign of coming back.
Meanwhile, as the British prepare to pull out of Basra, Shiites there are pushing for more independence.
As we approach the mid-September date for the much-awaited report on the effects of the surge the Iraqi government, on whose behalf the surge was allegedly initiated in the first place, the government which is supposed to be making progress toward a new Constitution, agreeable power-sharing and financial arrangements, the government we have sent 30,000 more young Americans over to fight and possibly die for ... that government is on the verge of collapse.
Apparently I am overdue for my administration-sponsored brainwashing. No matter how hard I squint, no matter how rosy I tint my glasses, no matter how often I chant happy mantras to myself ("Mission accomplished!" "Greeted with flowers!"), no matter how much effort I expend in positive thinking ... I just can't make this look like progress.
Thursday, April 19, 2007
A bad day in Baghdad
A series of five explosions rocked Baghdad yesterday, killing at least 171 people and wounding hundreds more. The worst was an explosion at a bus hub, which by itself killed 140+ and wounded 150 or more. The bombings have continued today, with an explosion killing 10 more. The day is still young.
Yesterday's violence was the worst in the Iraqi capital since the administration, disdaining the will of the people who elected him, launched his escalation there. Not surprisingly, despite the news being overshadowed by the Virginia Tech nightmare, the Supreme Court abortion ruling and the Gonzales testimony, some commentators are taking the opportunity to use it as a sign the escalation is already a failure. Thoughtful blogger x4mr makes a small allusion to this in a post he made last night.
I responded to x4mr's post, but wanted to expand on my thoughts here. I am opposed to the escalation and want us out of Iraq. However, just as I am frustrated when global warming sceptics try to use a single data point to dispute the seriousness (or even existence) of the problem (as in "hey, we just had a record storm in the Northeast - when does global warming kick in again??"), using a single data point to claim the escalation is not working is the same logical fallacy.
So ... let's look for more data points.
McClatchy provides some good information regarding US casualties in Iraq here, including an Excel spreadsheet with month-by-month tallies of US deaths, with a breakout for those in Baghdad. While the article accurately notes the last six months have been the deadliest six-month period for US troops since the war began, those figures are skewed by high figures in Oct. and Dec. of 2006, two of the five deadliest months of the war for US forces, and both occurring prior to the start of the "surge". Casualties in Feb. and Mar. of 2007 are much closer to the established baseline (which has, admittedly, trended up since the start of the war).
However, the first half of April (McClatchy's figures were posted Apr. 16) has been quite bad, and if the rate continues April will rank among the worst of the war for US casualties. Of course, the key words are "if the rate continues". It's also possible the recent convulsions will be followed by a lull, and the US casualty total for the month will be at or near the baseline.
(As an aside, US casualties within Baghdad have certainly trended up since the escalation, but that's to be expected with the extra combat missions occurring there.)
Looking at civilian casualty figures, the AP reported on April 13 that in the two months since the surge began civilian casualties in Baghdad has dropped to 1,586, down from 2,871 in the two months prior to the escalation. This was somewhat offset by an increase in civilian deaths outside the capital, rising from 1,009 in the two months prior to the surge to 1,504 in the two months since.
(I considered making some tallies of my own using the data available here, but that much time and energy I simply don't have. I wish the provided the DB or Spreadsheet containing the data so I could run some queries against it.)
Sooo ... what are my conclusions? Heck if I know. US casualties may jump some, but that's not yet clear. Iraqi civilian casualties do seem to be down. In general, though, despite some recent high-profile events (Wednesday's bombings, the bombing within the Green Zone), the overall figures don't yet show enough to make decisive statements for or against the efficacy of the surge.
Yesterday's violence was the worst in the Iraqi capital since the administration, disdaining the will of the people who elected him, launched his escalation there. Not surprisingly, despite the news being overshadowed by the Virginia Tech nightmare, the Supreme Court abortion ruling and the Gonzales testimony, some commentators are taking the opportunity to use it as a sign the escalation is already a failure. Thoughtful blogger x4mr makes a small allusion to this in a post he made last night.
I responded to x4mr's post, but wanted to expand on my thoughts here. I am opposed to the escalation and want us out of Iraq. However, just as I am frustrated when global warming sceptics try to use a single data point to dispute the seriousness (or even existence) of the problem (as in "hey, we just had a record storm in the Northeast - when does global warming kick in again??
So ... let's look for more data points.
McClatchy provides some good information regarding US casualties in Iraq here, including an Excel spreadsheet with month-by-month tallies of US deaths, with a breakout for those in Baghdad. While the article accurately notes the last six months have been the deadliest six-month period for US troops since the war began, those figures are skewed by high figures in Oct. and Dec. of 2006, two of the five deadliest months of the war for US forces, and both occurring prior to the start of the "surge". Casualties in Feb. and Mar. of 2007 are much closer to the established baseline (which has, admittedly, trended up since the start of the war).
However, the first half of April (McClatchy's figures were posted Apr. 16) has been quite bad, and if the rate continues April will rank among the worst of the war for US casualties. Of course, the key words are "if the rate continues". It's also possible the recent convulsions will be followed by a lull, and the US casualty total for the month will be at or near the baseline.
(As an aside, US casualties within Baghdad have certainly trended up since the escalation, but that's to be expected with the extra combat missions occurring there.)
Looking at civilian casualty figures, the AP reported on April 13 that in the two months since the surge began civilian casualties in Baghdad has dropped to 1,586, down from 2,871 in the two months prior to the escalation. This was somewhat offset by an increase in civilian deaths outside the capital, rising from 1,009 in the two months prior to the surge to 1,504 in the two months since.
(I considered making some tallies of my own using the data available here, but that much time and energy I simply don't have. I wish the provided the DB or Spreadsheet containing the data so I could run some queries against it.)
Sooo ... what are my conclusions? Heck if I know. US casualties may jump some, but that's not yet clear. Iraqi civilian casualties do seem to be down. In general, though, despite some recent high-profile events (Wednesday's bombings, the bombing within the Green Zone), the overall figures don't yet show enough to make decisive statements for or against the efficacy of the surge.
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